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English case of Warlow v. Harrison has been converted to stare decisis
through the judicial legitimization of the instant case. Thus, the phrase,
"without reserve," is of great legal significance, and must be treated with
due respect by both the auctioneer and the owner.
The right of the bidder to retract his bid still remains, up to the mo-
ment the hammer falls. But, there is some possibility that the bidder, too,
may be prevented from retracting his bid should an auction be advertised
"without reserve." The 1952 "Official Draft" of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, being prepared under the guidance of the National Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, provides, in section 2-328, that
"in an auction without reserve, the goods cannot be withdrawn nor a bid
retracted." Similarly in the editorial comment following the above section
it is stated: "The present section changes the prior rule by prohibiting the
withdrawal of bids as well as of the goods in auctions 'without reserve.'
This legislative provision would have the effect of interpreting the act of
placing goods for sale at an auction advertised to be "without reserve,"
as constituting an irrevocable offer, as in the instant case, which is im-
mediately perfected into a contract of sale upon the receipt of the highest
bid, which may not be withdrawn.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-IMPOTENCY AS
GROUND FOR ANNULMENT
The plaintiff and defendant had been married and subsequently di-
vorced by a decree of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in
1947. This decree gave plaintiff the custody of their minor son and also
decreed alimony to be paid to her monthly until she either remarried or
died, whichever occurred first. In June, 1950, plaintiff was remarried and
moved to California with her new husband. They cohabited there until
the beginning of November, when they separated. Defendant ceased the
alimony payments upon the remarriage and received no protest. In July
of 1951, plaintiff filed for and was granted an annulment from her second
husband in California, pursuant to the California statute allowing annul-
ment of a marriage due to impotency of one of the parties.' As soon as
the decree was entered making the marriage null and void, plaintiff de-
manded resumption of the alimony payments from the defendant, and
continued these demands upon her return to Glencoe, Illinois, in August
of 1951. When her demands were not heeded, plaintiff then petitioned for
a rule requiring defendant to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for failure to pay alimony. This petition was dismissed
in the Superior Court of Cook County. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate
1 California Civil Code (Deering, 1949), S 82.
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Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the ground that the
annulment obtained in California has no force or effect in Illinois, since
impotency is not a ground for annulment in Illinois, and therefore, that
the California decree of annulment for this ground did not revive the
obligation to pay alimony, such obligation having been terminated by
plaintiff's remarriage. Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 116 N.E.
2d 182 (1953).
The Linneman case represents a case of first impression in the courts
of Illinois in regard to impotency as a ground for annulment of a mar-
riage. While impotency, or physical inability to consummate a marriage,
has been a ground for divorce in Illinois since 1827,2 the court points out
that it has never been held to be a ground for annulment, nor has any
statute so provided.8
A question of Conflict of Laws was raised by this decision, since a valid
annulment decree, rendered in California in accordance with the law of
that forum, was not given full faith and credit in Illinois. This question
was resolved upon the theory that the law governing a marriage is the
law of the state where the marriage was entered into. Thus, for a valid
decree of annulment to be recognized in Illinois courts, grounds must
exist which would allow the marriage to be annulled in Illinois. This line
of reasoning is supported by other cases in Illinois,4 as well as Colorado,"
the federal courts, 6 and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.7
For an historical backround on impotency as a basis for annulment, we
must go back to the old English law where grounds for annulment were
divided into canonical and civil disabilities. The canonical disabilities-
consanguinity, affinity, impotency-rendered the marriage voidable, al-
lowing the parties to avoid the marriage only during their lifetimes, and
also providing that continued cohabitation, without protest, would serve
as a ratification of the voidable marriage. However the civil disabilities-
insanity, prior-existing marriage-rendered the marriage void. The canon-
ical disabilities came under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts
in England, and, since these courts were not recognized as courts of
record, American courts of equity, before enabling statutes were enacted,
held that they had no power to annul voidable marriages. 8 At the present
2 M. Rev. Stat. (1827), p. 181; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953), c. 40, S 1.
3 Linneman v. Linneman, 1 11. App. 2d 48, 116 N.E. 2d 182 (1953).
4 Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 Il. 92, 89 N.E. 255 (1909); Lehmann v. Leh-
mann, 225 111. App. 513 (1922).
5 Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P. 2d 495 (1950).
6 Carr v. Carr, 82 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. D.C., 1949).
7 § 115.
8 Anonymous, 24 N.J. Eq. 19 (1873); Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. 557, 14 Am. Dec.
563 (N.Y., 1825).
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time, only twenty American jurisdictions have statutes relating to im-
potency as a ground for annulment,0 with one of these prohibiting mar-
riage, 10 and another making the marriage void. 1
When courts of record in England began to hear matrimonial causes,
impotency was held to be a ground for annulment on the theory that to
hold otherwise might increase the prevalence of fornication and adultery.
This allowed the injured spouse to remarry and enjoy a normal marital
life. A doctrine of triennial cohabitation was developed as a basis for
annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency. This doctrine pro-
vided that if the wife was still a virgin and apt after cohabitation for a
three-year period, there was a rebuttable presumption that the husband
was impotent, and if the presumption were not satisfactorily rebutted, an
annulment could be decreed. 12 Cohabitation for a period less than three
years was deemed insufficient, and in the case of Marshall, f.c. Hamilton
v. Hamilton,13 where action was brought after two years and ten months,
the wife was instructed to return to cohabitation until the full three years
had elapsed. At the end of three years and a few months, upon petition,
the wife received an annulment based upon the non-rebutted presump-
tion of impotency of her husband.1
4
The case of F., f.c. D. v. D. 15 set aprecedent in England, allowing an
annulment at the end of only eighteen months of cohabitation, on the
basis that since the wife has proved the incurable impotency of her hus-
band, it would serve no purpose to force her to return for another like
term of cohabitation before she could petition for an annulment. The
court here decided that the doctrine of triennial cohabitation is only ap-
plicable when the impotency is left to be presumed and is not fully
proved.
The court in the case of Stagg, f.c. Edgecombe v. Edgecombe'6 re-
fused a wife's petition for annulment brought only a few months after
her marriage. The court recognized the doctrine, of triennial cohabita-
tion, but held it could be relaxed if the impotency has been adequately
proved, provided it was present at the time of the marriage, incurable,
9 Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
10 Georgia.
11 North Carolina.
12 Tomkins v. Tomkins, 92 N.J. Eq. 113, 111 At. 599 (1920).
13 3 Swa. & Tr. 517 (Prob., 1864).
14 Marshall, f.c. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 3 Swa. & Tr. 592 (Prob., 1864).
14 Swa. & Tr. 86 (Prob., 1865).
16 3 Swa. & Tr. 240 (Prob., 1863).
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and unknown to the spouse. However, only a few months was not suffi-
cient time to determine that the impotency was incurable.
The doctrine of triennial cohabitation was applied in New Jersey in
1920 in the case of Tomkins v. Tomkins,17 which appears to be the only
recorded American case applying the doctrine. Here, there was an un-
consummated marriage for a period of five years when the wife peti-
tioned for a decree of annulment. The annulment was awarded on the
grounds that the virginity and aptness of the wife after more than three
years cohabitation raised the presumption of impotency of the husband
which was not rebutted by him.
The first recorded American case on the question of impotency as a
ground for annulment, the Anonymous case, I8 decided in New Jersey in
1873, held that since impotency was a canonical ground cognizable by
the ecclesiastical courts, in the absence of express statutory provision, it
could not be recognized as a ground for annulment. Later New Jersey
cases did hold that impotency was a recognizable ground for annulment
of a marriage, if, at the time of entering into the marriage, the defendant
was incurably impotent, and this fact was unknown to the injured party
at the time.19 These decisions, however, were rendered after the New
Jersey legislature had enacted the appropriate statute.20
The Steinberger v. Steinberger,21 VandenBerg v. VandenBerg,22 and
Anonymous v. Anonymous 23 cases exemplify the decisions of the New
York courts allowing annulments on the ground of impotency pursuant
to statute. These cases hold that since consummation is an implied part
of the marriage contract, if one party can show that the other was in-
curably impotent at the time of the marriage, and remains so until an
action is brought, the New York statute will allow a decree of annul-
ment to be granted. The Anonymous case 24 held that the impotency
must have been present at the time of the marriage, and if caused by an
accident after marriage but before consummation thereof will not serve
as a ground for annulment. The Delaware courts2 5 also have followed
1792 N.J. Eq. 113, 111 At. 599 (1920).
18 24 N.J. Eq. 19 (1873).
19 Singer v. Singer, 9 N.J. Super. 397, 74 A. 2d 622 (1950); Heller v. Heller, 116
N.J. Eq. 543, 174 Atl. 573 (1934); Grobart v. Grobart, 107 N.J. Eq. 446, 152 AtI. 858
(1931); Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9, 118 Atl. 696 (1922).
20N.J. Rev. Stat. (1907), p. 475; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 2:50-1.
2133 N.Y.S. 2d 596 (1940).
22 197 N.Y. Supp. 641 (1923).
28 49 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (1944).
24 Ibid.
25 S. v. S., 3 Terry 192, 29 A. 2d 325 (Del., 1942); D. v. D., 2 Terry 263, 20 A. 2d
139 (Del., 1941).
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these New Jersey and New York decisions, referring to statutory pro-
visions.26
On the other side of the question is the Arizona case where the court
held that annulment on grounds of impotency could not be granted be-
cause not specifically provided for by statute27 although impotency was
a ground for divorce under the Arizona divorce statute.28
The only recorded case in the federal courts, the case of Carr v. Carr,29
held that although impotence is a valid ground for annulment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia by statute, the fact that the marriage was entered into
in Maryland requires that the law of Maryland be applied. Since there
is no enabling statute in Maryland, impotence is no ground for an annul-
ment, and the petition was denied.
Although the question was not raised in the instant case, 0 other juris-
dictions have ruled on the definition of impotency to be used in the in-
terpretation of the available statutes. The Devanbagh v. Devanbagh,sl
Turney v. Avery,8 2 and Donati v. Church8 cases point out that there is a
marked difference between impotency and sterility. In the former, sexual
intercourse is impossible, while in the latter, intercourse is possible, but
such intercourse would not lead to procreation. Thus, these courts hold
that the ability to have sexual intercourse is the test to be applied to de-
termine impotency, and not the ability, or lack of it, to propagate the
species. A very recent English decision is in accord with these cases,
wherein intercourse without insemination was considered good consum-
mation of the marriage to the extent that impotency did not exist.8 4
We now see that there are two distinct views present in the United
States in regard to impotency as a valid ground for the annulment of a
marriage. The wealth of cases seems to be in those jurisdictions where
there is a statute expressly allowing such ground to be used, although
these jurisdictions are in the minority numerically. The decision in the
Linneman case does not appear to be in conflict with the other views ex-
pressed, since there is no express statutory provision in Illinois. Therefore,
it appears that the Illinois courts will follow this decision until such time
as the Illinois legislature sees fit to enact the proper statutory provision to
the contrary.
26Del. Rev. Code (1915), § 3004; Del. Rev. Code (1935), S 3497.
27 Southern Pac. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P. 2d 700 (1939).
2 8 Ariz. Rev. Code (1928), § 2166, 2178.
29 82 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. D.C., 1949). 80 116 N.E. 2d 182 (Ill., 1953).
81 5 Paige 554, 28 Am. Dec. 443 (N.Y., 1836).
8292 N.J. Eq. 473, 113 At. 710 (1921).
88 13 N.J. Super. 454, 80 A. 2d 633 (1951).
84 R. v. R., otherwise F., [1952], 1 All E.R. 1194, 1 T.L.R. 1201 (P.D.A.).
